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Abstract
We survey the microfoundations, empirical evidence and estimation issues underlying the
aggregate matching function.  Several microeconomic matching mechanisms have been
suggested in the literature with some successes but none is generally accepted as superior to
all others.  Instead, an aggregate matching function with hires as a function of vacancies and
unemployment has been successfully estimated for several countries.  The Cobb-Douglas
restrictions with constant returns to scale perform well.  Recent work has utilized
disaggregated data to go beyond aggregate estimates, with many refinements and suggestions
for future research.
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1. Introduction
“Frictions” have made important inroads in modern macroeconomics. In the labor
market they are used to explain the existence of unemployment and (sometimes)
wage inequality. In business cycle models they are used to explain the ampli…ca-
tion of the response of employment to aggregate shocks. In coordination-failures
models they are used to justify the dependence of the strategy of one agent on
that of another. In monetary models they are used to explain the existence of
money.1 In the majority of cases, the modeling tool used to capture the in‡uence
of frictions on equilibrium outcomes is the aggregate matching function. This pa-
per surveys recent work on the existence and stability of the aggregate matching
function, with emphasis on microfoundations and empirical …ndings.
The attraction of the matching function is that it enables the modeling of fric-
tions in otherwise conventional models, with the minimum of added complexity.
Frictions derive from information imperfections about potential trading partners,
heterogeneities, the absence of perfect insurance markets, slow mobility, conges-
tion from large numbers, and other similar factors. Modeling each one of these ex-
plicitly would introduce intractable complexities in macroeconomic models. The
matching function captures their e¤ects on equilibrium outcomes in terms of a
small number of variables, usually without explicit reference to the source of the
friction.
Frictions also introduce monopoly rents in competitive markets, which in‡u-
ence behavior. The matching function has been used to study their implications
for wage and price determination.2 The Appendix traces the history of frictions
in economic modeling, leading up to the recent generation of equilibrium mod-
els with matching frictions. It argues that although the matching function was
not “discovered” by the recent vintage of models, in the sense that the idea (and
sometimes functional form) were present in earlier models, it was not until the late
1970s that it explicitly appeared in equilibrium models and was given a new and
far more important role in the characterization of equilibrium than had previously
been the case. In‡uential in this respect were equilibrium models of wage and em-
1Representative references include Pissarides (2000) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999b) on
the labor market, Montgomery (1991) and Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) on wage inequality, Merz
(1985) and Andolfatto (1986) on business cycles, Cooper and John (1988) and Diamond (1982a)
on coordination failures, and Diamond (1984) and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) on monetary
exchange.
2See, for example, Diamond (1982b) and the labor market references in the preceding foot-
note.
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ployment determination (Diamond, 1982a,b, Mortensen, 1982a,b, and Pissarides,
1984,1985).
Virtually all the work that we survey focuses on the labor market. This is
partly explained by the fact that frictions are likely to be more important in the
labor market than in other markets. But it also has to do with the fact that
in labor markets there are data sets that can be used to estimate and test the
matching function. A lot of the recent interest in the matching function stems from
the realization that modern labor markets are characterized by well-documented,
large ‡ows of jobs and workers between activity and inactivity3 The matching of
workers to new jobs is one half of the explanation for these ‡ows. Its outcome,
in conjunction with the outcome of the process that separates workers from jobs,
is often shown graphically in vacancy-unemployment space by the “Beveridge
curve.”4 Estimated Beveridge curves can shed light on the nature of the aggregate
matching function and we discuss some below. Most of the evidence that we
discuss, however, is in studies that estimate a matching function directly, either
at the aggregate or the sectoral level.
In section 2 we discuss the main ideas behind the matching function and we
give some pertinent evidence. We then take a look at the theoretical foundations of
the matching function and discuss some of the more important variables that are
likely to be in‡uential in empirical work (section 3). Section 4 discusses empirical
results in the context of the methods most frequently adopted in the estimation
of the matching function. Section 5 deals with the conceptual and measurement
issues due to search on the job and to the transitions of workers from out of
the labor force to employment. Aggregation problems across time and space are
discussed in section 6. The main conclusions are brought together in section 7.
The Appendix gives a brief historical overview of the literature on the role of labor
market frictions, leading to the birth of the matching function.
2. The Key Idea and Some Evidence
The matching function summarizes a trading technology between agents who place
advertisements, read newspapers and trade magazines, go to employment agencies
3See Davis et al. (1996) on the importance of job ‡ows and Blanchard and Diamond (1990a)
on the importance of worker ‡ows in the United States, and Burda and Wyplosz (1994) and
Contini et al. (1995) on the importance of ‡ows in Europe.
4See Pissarides (2000, chapter 1), Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and the many other refer-
ences listed in the notes on the literature to chapters 1 and 2 of Pissarides (2000).
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and mobilize local networks that eventually bring them together into productive
matches. The key idea is that this complicated exchange process is summarized
by a well-behaved function that gives the number of jobs formed at any moment
in time in terms of the number of workers looking for jobs, the number of …rms
looking for workers and a small number of other variables.
The matching function is a modeling device that occupies the same place in
the macroeconomist’s tool kit as other aggregate functions, such as the production
function and the demand for money function. Like the other aggregate functions
its usefulness depends on its empirical viability and on how successful it is in
capturing the key implications of the heterogeneities and frictions in macro mod-
els. In this survey we will focus on the microfoundations underlying the matching
function and on its empirical success but we will not discuss its modeling e¤ec-
tiveness.
The simplest form of the matching function is
M = m(U; V ); (2.1)
where M is the number of jobs formed during a given time interval, U is the
number of unemployed workers looking for work and V the number of vacant jobs.
The matching function is assumed increasing in both its arguments and concave
and usually homogeneous of degree 1. Testing for homogeneity, or constant returns
to scale, has been one of the preoccupations of the empirical literature. Other
restrictions usually imposed are m(0; V ) = m(U; 0) = 0 and in discrete-time
models whereM is the ‡ow of matches during an elementary period and U and V
are the stocks at the beginning of the period, m(U; V ) · min(U; V ): In continuous
time models, M is the instantaneous rate of job matching and U and V the
instantaneous stocks of unemployment and vacancies. In the absence of frictions,
M = min(U; V ) in discrete-time formulations and M ! 1 in continuous-time
models. Under constant returns to scale, M;U and V are usually normalized by
the labor force size, and denoted by lower-case letters.
On average an unemployed worker …nds a job during a period of unit length
with probability m(U; V )=U . Similarly, a vacant job is …lled with probability
m(U; V )=V . In a stationary environment, the inverse of each probability is the
mean duration of unemployment and vacancies respectively. Of course, if work-
ers and jobs are heterogeneous, the transition probabilities (or hazard rates) will
di¤er across the labor market, as will the mean durations. The aggregate match-
ing function is a useful device for introducing heterogeneities across workers, by
making the probability m(U; V )=U depend on individual characteristics. This
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has been a theme of the empirical literature which estimates hazard functions for
individual workers.
The dependence of the mean transition rates on the number of workers and
…rms engaged in search is an externality that has played an important role in the
analysis of the e¢ciency of search equilibrium. The average time that it takes a
…rm to …nd a worker depends on what searching workers do before they meet the
…rm. Similarly, the probability that an unemployed worker …nds a job depends
on what hiring …rms do, for example on whether they advertise or not and where
they advertise. Generally, search equilibrium is ine¢cient because when …rms and
workers meet the costs of their search, which in‡uence the transition probabilities,
are sunk.
The returns to scale in the matching function play an important role in models
with endogenous search e¤ort. If there are increasing returns to matching, as the
authors of some early models assumed (Diamond, 1982a, Howitt and McA¤ee,
1987) then there could be more than one equilibrium because of the complemen-
tarity between the search inputs of …rms and workers: in one equilibrium …rms
and workers put more resources into search, pushing up the returns from search
available to the other side, which justify the bigger inputs; in another they put less
e¤ort into search with lower returns from search, lower matching rate and higher
unemployment. Increasing returns to scale can support the high and low activity
equilibria even when there are increasing marginal costs to search e¤ort, whereas
constant returns cannot (although the complementarity between the actions of
…rms and workers is still present).
Evidence on the key matching-function idea comes from four sources. The …rst
one uses aggregate data on stocks of unemployment and vacancies and estimates
an equilibrium relation, the Beveridge (or UV ) curve. The second uses aggre-
gate data on ‡ows out of unemployment and estimates the aggregate matching
function, either for the whole economy or for a particular sector (usually man-
ufacturing). The third uses data on local labor markets, which can be either a
time-series or a panel, and estimates the matching function for each. The fourth
uses data on individual transitions and estimates hazard functions for unemployed
workers. We discuss each approach in some detail in subsequent sections. Here we
summarize the main implications of the empirical research for the simple matching
function in (2.1).
The Beveridge curve is an equilibrium relation that equates ‡ows in with ‡ows
out of unemployment. In vacancy-unemployment space it slopes downward if the
out‡ow from unemployment is given by the matching function in (2.1). Estimated
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Beveridge curves slope downwards but shift over time, especially in cases where
there have been secular increases in unemployment, as in most European countries
since the mid 1970s. So the matching function in (2.1) is not contradicted by the
Beveridge-curve evidence; but this evidence is indirect, it is consistent with other
mechanisms, and points to other variables that in‡uence job matching too.
Direct estimates of the matching function give better information about the
properties of (2.1). Table 1 summarizes the speci…cations adopted by aggregate
studies. Most studies that estimate aggregate functions …nd that a log-linear ap-
proximation to (2.1) …ts the data well. When data for the whole economy are
used the estimated functions satisfy constant returns to scale but some estimates
with manufacturing data show mildly increasing returns. The estimated elastic-
ities with respect to unemployment and vacancies vary, depending on whether
the dependent variable is the out‡ow from unemployment or the ‡ow from un-
employment to employment. When the dependent variable is the total out‡ow
from unemployment the estimated elasticity on unemployment is about 0.7 and
the elasticity on vacancies 0.3. Precise data on unemployment-to-employment
transitions are rarely available but when an approximation for the matching rate
is used the elasticity on unemployment drops, although not by much when other
‡ows into employment are ignored. A plausible range for the empirical elasticity
of unemployment is 0.5 to 0.7. There are good reasons for the drop in the elas-
ticity estimates when ‡ows from unemployment to non-employment are ignored,
that we discuss when we look at the estimates in more detail.
The aggregate estimates also …nd that there are other variables that in‡uence
matching in a systematic way. Disaggregate estimates, summarized in Table 2,
have not contradicted the aggregate estimates but concentrated instead on …nding
out what are those other variables and whether aggregation introduces biases that
can be estimated. With the number of estimates growing signi…cantly in recent
years, it is natural that there are estimates of both increasing and decreasing re-
turns to scale. But such divergencies from constant returns are only mild and rare.
The stylized fact that emerges from the empirical literature is that there is a sta-
ble aggregate matching function of a few variables that satis…es the Cobb-Douglas
restrictions with constant returns to scale in vacancies and unemployment.
Table 3 summarizes the results of studies that tested for constant returns.
The estimates of Burda and Wyplosz (1994) for some European countries show
diminishing returns to scale and those of Blanchard and Diamond (1990b) and
Warren (1996) for US manufacturing and Yashiv (2000) for Israel show increasing
returns. All other estimates, however, support constant returns.
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3. Microfoundations
What are the reasons for the existence of a well-behaved matching function and
what are the other variables that in‡uence the matching rate? In order to answer
these questions we need to look at the microfoundations behind the aggregate
matching function. The literature has done that; but although there are several
microeconomic models that can be used to justify the existence of an aggregate
matching function, none commands universal support and none convincingly says
why the aggregate matching function should be of the Cobb-Douglas form. The
literature has had more success, however, in suggesting what should be the other
variables that in‡uence the matching rate.
The other variables can be classi…ed into two groups. The …rst group includes
everything that individuals do during search, such as choosing how many applica-
tions to make, changing their advertising methods etc. The second includes shifts
unrelated to individual search decisions. We take up the second group …rst. Most
of the theoretical work on matching functions studies individual behavior and is
discussed in the subsections that follow.
3.1. Mismatch
The shifts in the matching function that are unrelated to search decisions are due
to technological advances in matching and to aggregation issues. Technological
advances include reforms such as the computerization of employment o¢ces, job
advertising on the internet, an increase in the resources that governments put into
subsidized matching, and other similar changes. Although changes of this type
have been observed recently in most industrial countries (see OECD, 1994, ch.
6, 1999) and they have in‡uenced the matching process to the extent that the
OECD recommends them to its members as the most cost-e¤ective “active” labor
market policies, they have attracted little formal theoretical or empirical work.
Aggregation issues have attracted more attention from labor economists, of-
ten disguised under the label “mismatch”. Mismatch is an empirical concept
that measures the degree of heterogeneity in the labor market across a number
of dimensions, usually restricted to skills, industrial sector and location. Large
di¤erences in skills among …rms would lengthen the time that it takes to match a
given group of workers to a given group of …rms, as agents search for a good match
among the heterogeneous group. Industrial sector matters in matching because of
industry-speci…c skills that may not be picked up by generally available measures
of skills. Finally, location in‡uences matching because of imperfect labor mobil-
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ity. Although the term “mismatch” has been used in the literature to describe all
three dimensions (see Layard et al., 1991), the term “imbalance” in numbers in
the local market has been used before to describe di¤erences in the distribution
of locations (see e.g. Holt, 1970b) and is a useful way of distinguishing between
skill mismatch and di¤erences in location.
If mismatch and imbalance in an economy were identically zero in all their
dimensions, the matching function would not exist and jobs and workers would
match instantaneously. It is because of the existence of some mismatch that
meetings take place only after a search and application process. If there is an
exogenous rise in mismatch, the rate of job matches at given inputs must fall,
implying a shift in the aggregate matching function.
Of course, if empirically mismatch changes frequently in ways that cannot be
accurately measured, the usefulness of the concept of the matching function is
reduced. But this requirement is not di¤erent from the one on other aggregate
functions in the macroeconomist’s tool kit. Some of the early controversies in
production theory (like the capital controversy of the two Cambridges) were about
the question whether factors of production could be aggregated into two or three
composites that enter a single-valued di¤erentiable production function. Whether
in practice aggregation problems are serious enough to question the usefulness of
the matching function is an empirical question. The available evidence does not
support serious aggregation problems that cannot be dealt with empirically.
In the empirical literature, mismatch, or imbalance, bears some relationship
to the frequently discussed “sectoral shifts hypothesis”, and to the older view
of “structural” unemployment, which was thought to be unemployment arising
from fast structural change in the economy as a whole. For example, it has
been argued that the oil, technology and other supply shocks of the 1970s and
1980s increased the speed with which unemployed workers needed to adapt to
the changing requirements of employers. This led to increased mismatch between
the skills possessed by workers and the skill requirements of employers, which
increased the duration of unemployment (and hence the stock of unemployment)
at given vacancies.
Lilien (1982) argues that imbalance in the distribution of jobs and workers
changes over the business cycle, to the extent that it can adequately explain the
observed ‡uctuations in aggregate employment. Although he …nds that his sec-
toral shifts hypothesis has some success in explaining US employment data, his
…ndings have been e¤ectively criticized by Abraham and Katz (1986) and Blan-
chard and Diamond (1989). Their critique points to the fact that the observed
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positive correlation between the dispersion of employment growth and the unem-
ployment rate can be either produced by sectoral shifts or by aggregate demand
‡uctuations. Information on job vacancies allows one to distinguish between the
two explanations. The strong negative correlation between unemployment and
vacancies supports an aggregate-demand interpretation of US employment ‡uctu-
ations rather than one based on sectoral shifts. Similar conclusions can be reached
from the observation that job creation and job destruction rates across sectors are
negatively correlated over the cycle (see Davis et al., 1996).
Layard et al. (1991, chapter 6) follow a di¤erent approach and measure mis-
match by the variance of sectoral unemployment rates. They show, however, that
their measure of mismatch cannot account for the shifts in the aggregate match-
ing function or the variance in UK unemployment. More recently, Manacorda
and Petrongolo (1999) propose a measure of skill mismatch that makes use of in-
formation about the demand and the supply of skills, represented respectively by
productivity parameters and labor force shares. This leads them to the conclusion
that the unbalanced evolution of the demand and the supply of skills can explain
some of the rise in unemployment in Britain, and hence some of the observed
shifts in the matching function, but still not all.
On balance, neither the sectoral shifts hypothesis nor mismatch has had much
success in accounting for a large fraction of ‡uctuations in employment or for the
secular rise in unemployment in some countries. So although empirical mismatch
variables can account for some of the shifts in the aggregate matching function,
we should look elsewhere for the main shift variables. But some authors (see
for example Entorf, 1998) argue that the measurement of mismatch in aggregate
studies of matching functions still su¤ers from many problems, and may be able to
account for more of the unexplained variance in matchings than currently found
in the literature.
If aggregation problems are not an issue, what can account for the matching
function and what else can shift it?
3.2. Coordination failures
The …rst matching function owes its origins to a well-known problem analyzed by
probability theorists, that of randomly placing balls in urns (Butters, 1977, Hall,
1979, Pissarides, 1979, Lang, 1991, Montgomery, 1991, Blanchard and Diamond,
1994). Firms play the role of urns and workers the role of balls. An urn becomes
“productive” when it has a ball in it. But even if there was exactly the same
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number of urns and balls, it is well-known that a random placing of the balls in
the urns will not match all the pairs exactly, because of a coordination failure by
those placing the balls in the urns. Some urns will end up with more than one
ball and some with none. In the context of the labor market, if only one worker
could occupy each job, an uncoordinated application process by workers will lead
to overcrowding in some jobs and no applications to others. The imperfection
that leads to unemployment here is the lack of information about other workers’
actions, though simple extensions could enrich the source of frictions.
In the simplest version of this process U workers know exactly the location
of V job vacancies and send one application each. If a vacancy receives one or
more applications it selects an applicant at random and forms a match. The other
applicants are returned to the pool of unemployed workers to apply again. The
matching function is derived by writing down an expression for the number of
vacancies that do not receive any applications. Given that each vacancy receives
a worker’s application with probability 1=V; and there are U applicants, there is
a probability (1¡ 1=V )U that a given vacancy will not receive any applications at




1 ¡ (1 ¡ 1=V )Ui : (3.1)




1 ¡ e¡U=V ´ : (3.2)
This matching function clearly satis…es the properties satis…ed by the general
function in (2.1), and in addition it satis…es constant returns to scale. It is,
however, too naive to be empirically a good approximation to matching in real
labor markets. For example, it implies an implausible combination of levels and
durations of unemployment. If the level of unemployment and vacancies is the
same, the mean duration of unemployment is 1:58 periods and if the level of
unemployment is three times as high as that of vacancies, mean duration is 3:16:
In actual labor markets duration would rise by more than the function (3.2) implies
when the level of unemployment is higher.
The introduction of small additional frictions to the urn-ball framework can
enrich the matching function considerably. We consider three related extensions.
In the …rst, workers do not know the …rms with the vacancies and choose at
random one …rm to apply. Then the probability that a vacancy receives no appli-
cations is (1 ¡ 1=(N + V ))U ; where N is the level of employment. If in addition
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the labor force size is L, N = L¡ U; the matching function becomes,
M = V
³
1 ¡ e¡U=(L¡U+V )´ : (3.3)
This matching function exhibits increasing returns to scale in U and V and may
even fail the assumption of diminishing returns to unemployment, though this
would require more vacancies than employment. But it satis…es constant re-
turns to L;U and V; so it avoids the counter-factual implication that larger coun-
tries should have lower equilibrium unemployment rates than otherwise identical
smaller countries.
In the second extension, not all workers are suitable for the vacancies available
but the worker does not know which vacancies are suitable. Let K be the fraction
of workers who are suitable employees for a randomly picked vacancy. The prob-
ability that a vacancy will not be visited by a worker is still 1=V but only KU
workers can now take the job. The matching function therefore generalizes to
M = V
³
1 ¡ e¡KU=V ´ ; (3.4)
with the inverse of K standing as an index of mismatch between the available jobs
and workers.
Our third extension gives a similar matching function but the new parameter is
associated with search intensity. Each period a fraction 1¡s of the unemployed do
not apply for a job. This fraction rotates, so each unemployed worker misses one
application round out of every 1=(1¡s) rounds. Then, the probability that a given
vacancy receives no applications during a given application round is (1¡ 1=V )sU ;
giving the matching function
M = V
³
1 ¡ e¡sU=V ´ : (3.5)
Both (3.4) and (3.5) satisfy all the properties of (2.1) for given K and s;
but in addition open up the possibility of modeling mismatch and the frequency
of applications, and so bringing the simple form (3.2) closer to the data. The
mean duration of unemployment for these functions is again U=M and so more
imbalance or a lower application frequency gives the longer mean durations for
given vacancy-to-unemployment ratio that the data suggest. We take up the
question of what might determine s next.
3.3. Worker heterogeneity: search intensity and reservation wages
The hazard rates (or unemployment durations) derived in the preceding section
were for “representative” individuals, without explicit dependence on individual
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characteristics. Yet, in empirical estimates, it is found that individual character-
istics play an important role in accounting for di¤erences in hazard rates across
individuals. In this sub-section and the next, we suggest two ways of introducing
the in‡uence of individual characteristics in the matching technology and show
what this does to the aggregate matching function.
Worker heterogeneity is most conveniently introduced into the matching func-
tion by making the assumption that the intensity of search is a choice variable.
We de…ne intensity of search as the number of “units” of search supplied by a
given individual. Units are de…ned as follows. If individual i supplies si units of
search and individual j supplies sj units, then in a small time interval individual
i is si=sj times more likely than individual j is to …nd a match. Search units are
supplied at a cost, which is normally increasing, and they are chosen optimally
to maximize the net returns from search (see Pissarides, 2000, chapter 5). There-
fore, di¤erent individuals will choose di¤erent number of search units, depending
on their search costs, the cost of unemployment and the expected returns from
employment.
To derive the matching function implied by this extension, let s be the average
number of search units supplied by an unemployed person.5 Then, the total
number of search units supplied is sU; and so the aggregate matching function is
M = m(sU; V ); (3.6)
a more general form of (3.5). Of course, varying intensity could also be introduced
for job vacancies, in symmetric fashion. The hazard rate for an individual who
supplies si units of search is sim(sU; V )=sU: The fact that this function depends
on individual characteristics through the optimal choice of intensity of search
justi…es the econometric estimates of hazard functions that make use of individual
survey data. On average, the representative individual will choose intensity s; so
the average transition rate for unemployed workers, which can be used in macro
modeling, is m(sU; V )=U:
Another channel through which heterogeneity can in‡uence the matching func-
tion and market outcomes arises when there is a distribution of wage o¤ers. The
distribution may be due to either identical …rms o¤ering di¤erent wages, as in
the model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998), or to match heterogeneity, as in
the model of Jovanovic (1979). The individual chooses a reservation wage and
5This s bears a close resemblence to the s of the preceding section, which explains the use
of a common symbol.
12
rejects all wage o¤ers below the reservation. In equilibrium models the reserva-
tion wage for each job that the worker encounters is such that neither the …rm
nor the worker will want to form a match if the wage is below reservation (see
Pissarides, 2000, chapter 6). Of course, if individual characteristics di¤er, workers
may choose di¤erent reservation wages.
Letm(U; V ) be the technology that brings vacant jobs and unemployed workers
together. When a pair meets it is faced with a wage o¤er w; which is assumed to
be a drawing from a probability distribution G(w): If the probability distribution
is known to job seekers the optimal policy of individual i is characterized by a
reservation wage Ri; such that the job is accepted if w ¸ Ri; rejected otherwise.
The hazard rate for this individual is [1¡G(Ri)]m(U; V )=U: Aggregation over all
individuals gives the average transition rate and from there, multiplication by the
unemployment rate gives the aggregate matching function. Clearly, given that in
general the probability G(Ri) is non-linear, the aggregate function takes a rather
complicated form, but to a …rst approximation we can de…ne R as the average
reservation wage and write the aggregate matching function as
M = [1 ¡G(R)]m(U; V ): (3.7)
As with the function derived for variable search intensity, (3.6), this function
justi…es the introduction of aggregate variables that in‡uence individual decisions
during search into estimated matching functions. The variables can be demo-
graphic variables that in‡uence the intensity of search - for example, if youths
search with lower intensity than adults the youth share in the population should
be a shift variable. Or they can be variables that in‡uence the cost of search and
moving, such as unemployment insurance variables and housing transaction costs.
The list of variables that can in‡uence search intensity and reservation wages has
been a fertile ground for searching for statistically signi…cant shift variables in
empirical matching functions, an issue discussed in the empirical sections that
follow.
3.4. Ranking
Blanchard and Diamond (1994) consider the alternative assumption that …rms
receive many applications at a time and have preferences over job applicants. They
rank applicants and o¤er the job to the person …rst in the rank. Their motivation
for studying this process is a feature of European labor markets, that with the rise
in unemployment durations, the long-term unemployed became “disenfranchised”
and less good employees than those with more recent work experience.
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The matching function used by Blanchard and Diamond (1994) is similar to
the urn-ball function (3.2) but the implications of the ranking principle can be
illustrated more generally. Suppose the unemployed are divided into two groups,
the short-term unemployed and the long-term unemployed. Let the number of
short-term unemployed be US and the number of long-term unemployed be UL:
Then, if a short-term and a long-term unemployed compete for the same job, the
short-term unemployed always gets it. Therefore, the long-term unemployed do
not cause congestion for the short-term unemployed during search and the long-
term unemployed get only jobs for which there are no short-term applicants. The
implication of the …rst claim is that the matching function for the short term un-
employed is mS(US; V ); where V are all the vacancies, and the matching function
satis…es all the properties of (2.1). If the long-term unemployed knew which vacan-
cies are now being taken by the short-term unemployed, their matching function
would be mL(UL; V ¡MS): But more generally, if there is a coordination failure
between short-term and long-term unemployed, we write as usual m(US+UL; V )
for total matches and then attribute the di¤erence betweenM andMS to matches
involving long-term unemployed. That is, the aggregate matching function is
M = m(US + UL; V ) (3.8)
but the hazard rate for the short-term unemployed is mS(US; V )=US and for the
long-term unemployed m(US+UL; V )=UL¡mS(US; V )=UL:6 Simple calculations
show that if the matching functions are identical the hazard rate of the short-term
unemployed is always higher than the hazard rate of the long-term unemployed.
Blanchard and Diamond (1989) estimate a speci…cation similar to (3.8) and
impose that the short- and long-term unemployed are perfect substitutes up to
a scale parameter. If the estimated value of this parameter is below one it is
evidence in favor of the ranking hypothesis. Their point estimate of the scale
parameter, however, slightly exceeds one, but is not signi…cantly di¤erent from
zero.
3.5. Stock-‡ow matching
The matching functions discussed so far were derived under the assumption that
job seekers take a vacant job at random and apply for it. This assumption is
6Note that the expected duration of unemployement of the long-term unemployed is the
inverse of their hazard rate but for the short-term unemployed account has to be taken of the
fact that if they survive to long-term unemployment, their hazard rate will fall.
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convenient and realistic in many situations, given that there is an element of luck
in hearing about job o¤ers. But there is also a systematic element in search.
This sub-section and the next discuss the derivation of an aggregate matching
function from assumptions that go to the other extreme of no randomness in job
applications.
Coles (1994) and Coles and Smith (1998) consider the implications of the
assumption that job seekers have complete information about the available job
vacancies and apply simultaneously to all the ones that they think are likely to be
acceptable. Let this number be the entire universe of jobs on o¤er. But because
of heterogeneity, not all job matches turn out to be acceptable. Let a constant
® be the probability that a job match is unacceptable to the pair. A matching
round then begins in a “marketplace”. Job-worker pairs that made contact and are
unacceptable are rejected. The remaining acceptable ones are sorted out so that no
…rm and worker who could form an acceptable match remain unmatched. Thus,
unlike the urn-ball process of the preceding example, there is no coordination
failure in this case. Those workers who remain unmatched do so because there
are no vacancies that are suitable for them among the existing pool.
It follows that no job vacancy or unemployed worker who has been through
one round of matching will attempt to match again with a pre-existing job seeker
or vacancy. Of course, the assumption that the length of time when job seekers
and vacant jobs get to know each other is one matching period is a simplifying
one. Coles and Smith’s assumption captures a realistic feature of search markets,
that a job seeker scans a lot of advertisements before deciding where to apply and
once an advertisement has been scanned and rejected, return to it is less likely
than application to a new advertisement.
Under Coles and Smith’s assumption there is a sharp distinction between the
stocks of unemployed workers and vacant jobs and the new in‡ows. The stock
of unemployed workers at the beginning of the period will not match with the
stock of vacant jobs also at the beginning of the period, because they were both
participants in the matching round in the previous period. The resulting matching
process is therefore one where the unmatched stock of traders on one side of the
market is trying to match with the ‡ow of traders on the other side. This is often
referred to as “stock-‡ow” matching.7
Let the stocks at the beginning of the period be U0 and V0: If the ‡ow of new
unemployed workers and new job vacancies into the respective pools during the
period are U1 and V1, the U0 initial workers match with the new in‡ow V1 only,
7Coles (1999) discusses the turnover externalities implied by stock-‡ow matching.
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whereas the in‡ow U1 matches with both V0 and V1: Coles and Smith consider a
period of in…nitesimal length and so ignore the probability of a newly unemployed
worker matching with a newly created vacant job. In this case, the probability
that a new vacancy is matched on entry is 1 ¡ ®U0 ; so the matches due to new
vacancy creation are V1(1 ¡ ®U0): Recall that ® is the probability that a random
pairing is unacceptable. The probability that a new worker is matched on entry
is 1¡®V0 and so the new matches due to the new entry of workers is U1(1¡®V0):
Since there are no matches between old unemployed and old vacancies, the sum
of the two matches gives the entire matching rate in the economy. That is, the
matching function is
M = V1(1 ¡ ®U0) + U1(1 ¡ ®V0); (3.9)
with 1 > ® > 0.
The hazard rate for workers who are unemployed at the beginning of the period
is V1(1¡®U0)=U0 and for the new in‡ow 1¡®V0 : The latter is likely to be smaller
because for the short period under analysis, the stock of jobs and workers is likely
to be much bigger than the new ‡ow, i.e., V1 ¿ V0 and V1 ¿ U0:
The matching function in (3.9) exhibits increasing returns to scale in the stocks
and the ‡ows, although it is not homogeneous. The reason is that job seekers apply
to all the available job vacancies simultaneously. If we double the number of job
vacancies and unemployed workers, the applications of each and every job seeker
double. This contrasts with the matching function in (3.2), where each job seeker
applies only to one job and so doubling the number of jobs doubles the number of
applications. Applying to more than one vacancy at a time is a realistic feature
of the application process but it depends on a constant rejection probability ®:
When the rejection probability is endogenized, we would expect it to increase
when the matching probability increases. Intuitively, the model captures the fact
that in a large market job seekers have more options but not the fact that they
would be more choosy as a result.
The model implies that the matching probability for the unemployment in-
‡ow does not su¤er from congestion, whereas the pre-existing unemployed su¤er
congestion from each other. This result derives from the assumption that new-
comers ‡ow into the market individually, given the continuous time structure of
the matching process that takes place across time periods of in…nitesimal length.
If instead we consider time periods of discrete length, a newly unemployed can
match with a new vacancy, and at the same time all the newly unemployed can
cause congestion to one another when trying to match with existing vacancies.
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The extra congestion externalities generated in this case are shown by Gregg and
Petrongolo (1997) to rule out increasing returns to scale.
Stock-‡ow matching has received some empirical support. Coles and Smith
(1998) argue that, due to stock-‡ow matching, exit rates are higher when traders
…rst enter the labor market, and drop sharply thereafter. This suggests that
traders who are unlucky at their …rst round of search need to wait and queue for
new entrants in order to …nd a suitable match. There are, however, many other
reasons for the fall in unemployment exit rates, which include ranking, discour-
agement and loss of skills during unemployment. But more detailed evidence on
matching combinations among labor market participants shows that stock-‡ow
matching plays a signi…cant role in raising the matching probabilities of recently
unemployed workers.
Coles and Smith estimate a log-linear matching function dividing the out‡ow
from unemployment into duration classes. They …nd that both the stock and the
in‡ow of vacancies increase the unemployment out‡ow at short durations of search
but at longer durations only the in‡ow of new vacancies increases signi…cantly the
job …nding rates of the unemployed. Qualitatively similar results are also found
by Gregg and Petrongolo (1997), who estimate quasi-structural out‡ow equations
for unemployment and vacancies derived from a stock-‡ow matching model in
discrete time.
3.6. Aggregation over distinct markets
We …nally discuss a derivation of the aggregate matching function that relies on
the existence of disequilibrium in micro markets and limited mobility of labor.
The assumption is that the economy is divided into micro markets that do not
su¤er from frictions but su¤er from a disequilibrium in the sense that the demand
for labor in each market is not equal to the supply. There is no mobility of labor
or capital between markets. This assumption can be interpreted as the source
of the friction that gives rise to the aggregate matching function. It implies
that markets with unemployment can co-exist with markets with job vacancies
although no market has both. Aggregation over all markets gives an aggregate
function that contains both vacancies and unemployment. With perfect mobility
workers would move until the short side of the aggregate economy cleared and no
aggregate matching function would exist.
A model of this form was …rst used by Hansen (1970) to derive the Beveridge
curve (see also Holt, 1970b). Other studies that follow this approach are Drèze and
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Bean (1990), Bentolila and Dolado (1991) and Franz (1991). Borrowing results
discussed by Drèze and Bean (1990, p. 14), who credit Lambert (1988) for the
derivations, suppose that the ratio of vacancies to unemployment in each micro
market is lognormally distributed. Then, if the short side of each market clears
and U and V are the aggregate quantities, there is a CES-type relationship that
could be interpreted as an aggregate matching function
M =
³
U¡½ + V ¡½
´¡1=½
; (3.10)
where ½ > 0 is related to the variance of the ratio of unemployment to vacancies
across micro markets.
The derivation of this matching function needs the assumptions of exogenous
distributions of unemployment and vacancies across space. Lagos (1997) derives
instead optimal rules for the allocation of agents across space, under the assump-
tion that there is uncertainty about the number of agents at each location. He
shows that the resulting matching equilibrium is one where the short side of the
market clears - but now the number of agents on one side is optimally selected
(see also Lagos and Violante, 1998).
As far as we are aware, there are no tests of this microfoundation for the
aggregate matching function. A key problem here is to de…ne the unit of the
micro market. If a micro market is in…nitesimally small, and consists of at most
one job each, the assumption is trivially correct. If it is large and equal to the
economy as a whole, the assumption is incorrect, since at the aggregate level
vacancies and unemployment co-exist. A travel-to-work area would appear to be
the most appropriate disaggregation level but no tests have been conducted at
this level. Another di¢culty with the CES form is that it relies on distributional
assumptions about unemployment and vacancies and a test of the CES restrictions
(e.g. versus Cobb-Douglas) would need to test the validity of the distributional
assumptions as well.8
4. Empirical Methods and Findings
In the matching framework the equilibrium levels of unemployment and job vacan-
cies that persist in steady state are the result of the intensity of the job reallocation
8Graph theory can also potentially be used to derive results about the interaction of agents
in markets with frictions, although there are as yet no clear-cut implications for the aggregate
matching function. See Ioannides (1997).
18
process and of the matching e¤ectiveness of the labor market. One way of making
inferences about the empirical properties of the matching function is to estimate
such a long-run vacancy-unemployment relationship, the UV or Beveridge curve.
The advantage from taking this indirect route is that estimation of the Beveridge
curve requires only data on stock variables, not ‡ows, which are more readily
available. The early literature on matching followed mainly this approach. But
partly because of the di¢culty of making accurate inferences about the matching
function from estimated Beveridge curves (outlined below) and partly because
the connection between the matching function and the Beveridge curve became
better understood, most of the empirical literature since the late 1980s and early
1990s estimated directly the matching function. As more data became available
estimated matching functions appeared in the literature making use of aggregate
time-series for the whole economy or for some sector (most frequently manufac-
turing), panel data for regions or districts, and data on individual re-employment
hazards. We review the main results of each approach with focus on the results
not previously discussed.
4.1. Beveridge curves
A steady-state Beveridge (or UV) relationship between the unemployment rate
and the vacancy rate can be derived from the simple matching function (2.1). Let
U and V be the number of unemployed workers and job vacancies respectively,
and N and L the level of employment and the labor force (so L = N + U):
De…ne the unemployment rate u = U=L and let the vacancy rate be v = V=N (an
inconsequential change from the alternative v = V=L). Assume also that the job
separation rate is ¸; so total separations are S = ¸N: Then, imposing constant
returns to scale on m(:) and noting that in steady state the number of matches












1 ¡ u; v
¶
: (4.1)
Given the separation rate ¸; our assumptions on m(:) imply a negative steady-
state relationship between the unemployment rate and the vacancy rate.
An aggregate Beveridge curve of the form of equation (4.1) was estimated
by a number of authors for the aggregate stocks of vacancies and unemployment
9Note that constant returns in U and V are not needed here. Suppose for example that the
matching function has constant returns in U; V and N; as in (3.3) but increasing returns in U
and V: Then dividing through by N gives an expression with properties similar to (4.1).
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(see for example Jackman and Roper 1987, Budd et al. 1988, Jackman et al.
1989 and Wall and Zoega 1997 for Britain, Abraham 1987 for the US, Franz 1991
for Germany, Edin and Holmlund 1991 for Sweden, Brunello 1991 for Japan and
Jackman et al. 1990 for a multi-country study). The form preferred is usually
log-linear, which implies a Cobb-Douglas matching function if the foundation for
the Beveridge curve is the aggregate matching function. All studies establish the
existence of a negative long-run relationship between the vacancy rate and the
unemployment rate, as implied by (4.1). But virtually all studies also identify
some shift variables, not present yet in (4.1).
Of course, (4.1) is consistent with many di¤erent micro frameworks, some
perhaps unrelated to the matching framework. But if we posit that there is an
aggregate matching function underlying (4.1), some lessons immediately emerge
from the Beveridge curve studies about the properties of the matching function.
First, there is support for the restrictions on the simple two-variable matching
function, including some tentative evidence for constant returns. The negative
convex-to-the-origin shape predicted by the model …ts the data well and in the
cross-country regressions country size does not appear to be an in‡uence on the
position of the Beveridge curve, something that would be implied by some models
of increasing or decreasing returns to scale. But no study conducts a careful
test of increasing returns to scale by testing, for example, whether the matching
rate improves when the total number of participants increases for given ratio of
vacancies to unemployment, or whether there are increasing returns to U and V
but constant returns to U; V and L; as implied for example by (3.3).
Second, there have been shifts in the relationship, especially in European coun-
tries. These shifts coincide with the secular rise in European unemployment, which
started in the mid 1970s. The unemployment rate has increased despite the fact
that the separation rate and the vacancy rate, ¸ and v in (4.1), have not shown
any trend. The implication for the matching function is that there are variables
besides u and v that have played an important role in matching in the last two
decades and these variables contributed to a deterioration of the matching rate.
Reasons that have been suggested in the literature include mismatch (Jackman
et al., 1989) - which as we have seen may explain some but not much of the shift
- the growth in long-term unemployment, which reduces both the search intensity
of the unemployed and their employability through loss of skill (Budd et al. 1988),
the generosity of the unemployment insurance system (Jackman et al. 1989) and
active labor market policy (Jackman et al. 1990). Jackman and Roper (1987)
have shown that in Britain the shifts in the regional Beveridge curves were of
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the same order of magnitude as the aggregate curve, casting more doubt on the
power of regional mismatch to explain the shift in the aggregate curve. On a
more positive note, Jackman et al. (1990) show that the di¤erent position of the
estimated Beveridge curves in Europe is positively correlated with their spending
on active labor market policies. Countries with more spending on policies that
aid matching have Beveridge curves closer to the origin.
But on average no single or combination of variables can account for the de-
terioration of the matching rate since the mid 1970s, and the literature often
attributes it to unmeasured elements of the unemployment insurance system and
mismatch. It is interesting that measured components of the unemployment in-
surance system do not play a role in the deterioration of the matching rate. Un-
measured elements mentioned in the literature are usually statements about the
leniency of the system and its coverage. In the estimation such measures are
usually picked up by time trends, which could of course account for many other
unobserved or unidenti…ed in‡uences on matching.
Estimation of log-linear UV curves, along the lines followed by most of the
studies mentioned, su¤ers from some problems, connected with the assumption of
‡ow equilibrium, the endogeneity of the separation rate and the fact that infer-
ences about the micro process underlying matching cannot be easily made from
such an aggregate framework. More recent studies estimate matching functions
by making use of ‡ow data, which are more disaggregated and do not have to rely
on either a constant (or exogenous) job separation rate or ‡ow equilibrium.
4.2. Aggregate studies
Table 1 gives a summary of the speci…cations and the results of studies that have
estimated aggregate matching functions. Pissarides (1986) estimates an aggre-
gate matching function for Britain over the period 1967-1983. The speci…cation
adopted uses quarterly data with the average monthly out‡ow rate from male
unemployment during the quarter as the dependent variable. The unemployment
series used is for registered male unemployment and the series for vacancies is
noti…ed vacancies adjusted upwards for incomplete coverage.10 Results with both
10Reported vacancy data are generally unreliable. In several countries (including the United
Kingdom, France, Germany and Israel), data on job vacancies are collected on a regular basis.
The data, however, are for vacancies noti…ed to state employment agencies and they su¤er from
under-reporting, with the exception of some rare instances where reporting is mandatory (see,
e.g. Yashiv, 2000). In addition, the proportion of vacancies noti…ed varies with general economic
conditions, both aggregate and sectoral (see Jackman et al., 1989). Jackman et al. suggest an
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+ ®2t+ ®3t2 (4.2)
+lags + structural variables.
Both the linear and log-linear speci…cation strongly support constant returns to
scale in U and V (see Table 3). The estimated elasticity of matches with re-
spect to vacancies is 0.3 with an implied elasticity of matching with respect to
unemployment 0.7. No other variables were found to be signi…cant except for
the time trends, which indicate a large fall in the rate of job matches at given
unemployment and vacancy rate during the sample period.
Later estimation of a similar regression by Layard et al. (1991, chapter 5) for
1968-1988 found similar elasticity estimates but also found that the rise in long-
term unemployment reduces the matching rate at given unemployment rate. But
the time trend remains signi…cant in their regression. Also, the authors do not
deal with the endogeneity of long-term unemployment but measure its impact
by computing an index for duration e¤ects. This index is a weighted average
of duration with …xed weights that are proportional to the out‡ow rates from
each category in a base year. The fact that out‡ow rates fall with duration and
duration increases during the sample gives an upward trend to the index, which
is positively correlated with the trend in unemployment.
Long-term unemployment has been a frequent candidate for shifts in the ag-
gregate matching function (see Budd et al., 1985). Although this is related to
Blanchard and Diamond’s (1994) idea of ranking, it is more general, in the sense
that the claim being made is that the average matching rate should be higher the
lower the incidence of long-term unemployment.11 Denoting again the stock of
short-term unemployed by US and the stock of long-term unemployed by UL; this
implies that the aggregate matching function takes the form
adjustment method to correct for the under-reporting, which makes use of information contained
in the fraction of job matches realized through state employment agencies. In the United States
these is no comparable vacancy series. The proxy most frequently used is the help-wanted
index, which is based on the counts of job advertisements in major metropolitan newspapers.
(see Abraham 1987).
11Note that the way that we formalized the ranking idea in equation (3.8) does not justify
the claim made in the text about average matching rates. Ranking a¤ects only the distribution
of matches across the unemployed. But the frequently-made assumption that the long-term









where the last variable included should have a negative impact on the matching
rate. This prediction is con…rmed by Burgess (1993) for Britain, Mumford and
Smith (1997) for Australia, and Bell (1997) for Britain, France, and Spain. The
speci…cation adopted by Layard et al. (1991), is similar to the one in (4.3) but
with the alternative measure of long-term unemployment described above.
Blanchard and Diamond (1989, 1990b) estimate a matching function for the
United States over the period 1968-1981. The estimated equation is a log-linear
speci…cation in levels
lnMt = ®0 + ®1 lnUt + ®2 lnVt + ®3t; (4.4)
where the log of monthly national hirings is used as the dependent variable, un-
employment is interpreted as a proxy for all job seekers (including employed and
out-of-the-labor force) and the vacancy series was constructed from the help-
wanted index. The estimated elasticities of matches with respect to vacancies and
unemployment are positive and signi…cant, and the time trend generally comes in
with a negative and signi…cant coe¢cient (but smaller than in Britain or other
large European countries), implying a deterioration in the matching e¤ectiveness
of the labor market since the late 1960s. They …nd clear evidence of the existence
of an aggregate matching function with constant or mildly increasing returns to
scale, unit elasticity of substitution, and weights of 0.4 and 0.6 on unemployment
and vacancies respectively. But the weight 0.4 is found when the unemployment
rate is used as a proxy for all job seekers, which may not be appropriate when
the number of employed job seekers is pro-cyclical; when the left-hand side vari-
able is restricted to include only job matches from unemployment, the weight on
unemployment rises to 0.6.
The higher unemployment elasticity of matching found in the British studies
can be the result of the di¤erent dependent variable used. Pissarides (1986) and
Layard et al. (1991) use the total out‡ow from unemployment whereas Blanchard
and Diamond (1989, 1990b) construct a ‡ow variable that approximates the total
number of hires (including job-to-job moves and ‡ows from inactivity directly into
employment, a point that is not relevant here but addressed in the next section).
Burda and Wyplosz (1994), who estimate log-linear matching functions for France,
Germany and the United Kingdom by regressing total exits from unemployment
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on vacancy and unemployment stocks, also found high elasticities of matches with
respect to unemployment, in the range 0:5 ¡ 0:7.
To see more formally the point that we are making, let X denote total exits
from unemployment and M denote total hires, again from unemployment. Let
also D denote exits from unemployment to out of the labor force, a combination
of “discouraged” worker e¤ects, early retirement and going back to school. Let
M be a log-linear constant returns to scale function of the type estimated by
Blanchard and Diamond and D depend on vacancies with elasticity ¡® and on
unemployment with elasticity ¯: If the tightness of the market V=U is a good
measure of the cycle (as it is likely to be under constant returns, see Pissarides,
2000), and movements from unemployment to inactivity depend only on the cycle,
we expect ® = ¯: But if the experience of unemployment has additional in‡uences
on retirement and dropping out, we should expect on a priori grounds ¯ ¸ ®: The
function estimated by the European studies is (with constants omitted)
X = M +D
= U´V 1¡´ + U¯V ¡®: (4.5)
Studies that use a measure ofM in their regressions estimate ´ directly. Blanchard
and Diamond’s estimate for this number is 0:6 and similar estimates (in the range
0:55 ¡ 0:70) are found by van Ours (1995), Boeri and Burda (1996) and Burda
and Pro…t (1996) for other countries.
























= 1 ¡ ´ ¡ (1 ¡ ´ + ®)D
X
: (4.7)
The elasticity estimate obtained by studies that use the total exit as dependent
variable should be lower for vacancies and, if ¯ > ´; higher for unemployment.
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Moreover, given that both sets of studies …nd constant returns to scale, the pa-
rameters must be such that
¯ = 1 + ®: (4.8)
This necessarily implies that ¯ > ®; that is, the experience of unemployment has
an independent in‡uence on dropping out of the labor force, in addition to its
cyclical in‡uence.
Blanchard’s and Diamond’s estimate of 0:6 for ´; the Pissarides-Layard et al.
estimate of 0:7 for the unemployment elasticity of total exits, and a plausible mean
value for the ratio D=X (the fraction of unemployment exits that leave the labor
force) of 0:412 give ¯ = 0:85 and a negative value for ®: These numbers, however,
are derived from the di¤erence between a point estimate of 0:6 and one of 0:7
and they are sensitive to small changes in these estimates. Given the estimates,
a useful approximation that is well within the con…dence interval of the elasticity
estimates is one where ® = 0; i.e. one with implied total exit from unemployment
of
X = U´V 1¡´ + °U; ´; ° 2 (0; 1): (4.9)
Blanchard and Diamond (1989, 1990b) also estimate equation (4.4) for the US
manufacturing sector alone. The results that they obtain in this case are broadly
consistent with the aggregate ones, with the important quali…cation that the
manufacturing matching function displays increasing rather than constant returns
to scale. The estimated sum of the elasticity of matches with respect to vacancy
and unemployment is now 1.4 (see Table 3). Estimates for US manufacturing are
also reported by Warren (1996) who estimates a more ‡exible translog function
for all manufacturing for 1969-1973, when a vacancy series for this sector was
available. The translog speci…cation gives a more accurate estimate of the returns
to scale of a technology than the Cobb-Douglas form (see Guilkey et al. 1983).
The dependent variable in Warren’s study is total hires in manufacturing and the
unemployment variable consists of all those currently unemployed who previously
held jobs in the manufacturing sector. The correspondence of the ‡ow variable
that is used as dependent variable with the stock on the right hand side is poor
but almost inevitable when hires in only one sector are used. He …nds statistically
signi…cant increasing returns to scale with sum of coe¢cients on vacancies and
unemployment of 1.33. Similar results are found by Yashiv (2000), on both a
log-linear and a translog matching function for the whole Israeli economy over the
12This is obtained from the data on worker ‡ows reported by Burda and Wyplosz, 1994.
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period 1975-1989. The estimated returns to scale in his matching function lie in
the range 1.20-1.36.
The other studies summarized in Table 1 generally con…rm the results of the
earlier studies discussed in this section for di¤erent countries and time periods.
4.3. Sectoral studies
The di¢culty with making inferences about labor market matching from aggregate
time series beyond the initial results of the studies discussed in the preceding
section led many authors to switch to more disaggregate speci…cations, either in
panel or single cross-sections. Table 2 summarizes results for a number of sectoral
studies.
Anderson and Burgess (2000) estimate a state-industry panel for the United
States over the period 1978-1984, using a similar speci…cation to Blanchard and
Diamond’s (1989) aggregate study. They also include variables for sex and age
composition of the labor force and the degree of unionization, and distinguish new
hires by origin, namely whether they come from employment or non-employment.
Although the sum of estimated elasticities is well above one when hires from
employment are used as the dependent variable, in neither case can the constant
returns hypothesis be rejected at the conventional signi…cance levels.
In an attempt to apply the matching function analysis to local labor markets,
Coles and Smith (1996) and Bennet and Pinto (1994) both provide cross-section
estimates of the matching function for local labor markets in Britain. Local labor
markets are represented in Coles and Smith (1996) by travel-to-work areas. They
use data for 257 areas in 1987 and estimate a regression for total hirings. As in the
US studies they …nd an elasticity of 0.7 on vacancies and 0.3 on unemployment.
Their study also shows the importance of the geographic density of unemployment
and vacancies in the hiring process, with more concentrated labor markets having
higher matching rates. The analysis of Bennet and Pinto (1994) uses instead
data from Training and Enterprise Councils, estimating a time series for each
(Britain is divided into about 100 such areas). They …nd that the parameters of
the matching technology do not vary substantially across districts, the elasticities
being within a narrow range of 0.5 for both unemployment and vacancies, and
therefore con…rm that there are no serious problems of aggregation.
The Coles and Smith and the Bennet and Pinto studies treat local labor mar-
kets as isolated marketplaces. Interactions among neighboring districts are mod-
eled by Burda and Pro…t (1996), Burgess and Pro…t (1998), and Petrongolo and
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Wasmer (1999), who …nd evidence of matching spillovers across space but with
smaller coe¢cients for neighboring districts. This …nding highlights the impor-
tance of moving costs in matching and is consistent with Coles’ and Smith’s …nding
that population density matters in local matching rates. We take up the issue of
spatial aggregation below.
4.4. Micro studies
The estimation of re-employment probabilities for unemployed individuals has
the potential of distinguishing between the determinants of the probability of
receiving a job o¤er and that of accepting it. The former depends on the set of
characteristics that in‡uence a worker’s productivity (such as age, education and
experience) and on local labor demand conditions, which is the e¤ect captured
by aggregate matching functions. The second probability depends on a worker’s
reservation wage, and therefore on the expected distribution of wages, the cost of
search, unemployment income and the probability of receiving a job o¤er.
Structural studies (see Kiefer and Neumann 1979a,b, 1981; Flinn and Heckman
1982, Narendranathan and Nickell 1985; Wolpin 1987; and Eckstein and Wolpin
1995) identify separately an accepted wage equation and a wage o¤er equation,
and so they can distinguish between the determinants of each of these proba-
bilities. Reduced-form or hazard function studies estimate instead the factors
a¤ecting the product of the two probabilities, namely the transition of workers
from unemployment to employment, and are therefore more directly comparable
with matching function studies.
Despite this connection, however, micro studies have not been used in the
empirical search literature to make inferences about the properties of the aggregate
matching function, with very few exceptions. Their contribution can be twofold.
Micro studies control for a number of individual characteristics which can be
aggregated to give shift variables in the aggregate matching function besides U
and V: They can also be used to test for the e¤ect of local labor market conditions
on re-employment probabilities and from there aggregate to make inferences about
the in‡uence of local conditions on aggregate matching.
The early study by Lancaster (1979) uses a sample of British unskilled male
workers to show that exit rates from unemployment are negatively a¤ected by age,
the duration of search, and the local unemployment rate. The age e¤ect in the
job-…nding hazard implies that the age composition of the labor force should play
a role in aggregate matching function estimates, with a younger pool of job-seekers
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delivering higher exit rates from unemployment (see for example Coles and Smith
1996 and Anderson and Burgess 1995). Negative duration dependence in job
search implies that the incidence of long-term unemployment should reduce the
unemployment out‡ow in aggregate speci…cations, which is con…rmed by, among
others, Layard et al. (1991) and Burgess (1993). Finally, the negative e¤ect of
unemployment captures the congestion e¤ect of a larger pool of job-seekers on
individual job-…nding rates. This should translate into an aggregate elasticity
of matches with respect to unemployment less than 1, which is the case in all
aggregate studies.
Following Lancaster’s application of duration models to re-employment prob-
abilities, a large number of papers have studied the determinants of exit rates
from unemployment, looking at a variety of speci…cations and control variables.13
Perhaps surprisingly, a result that frequently appears in the micro studies but
not in aggregate studies is the in‡uence of the unemployment insurance system
(see Nickell, 1979 and Narendranathan et al. 1985). Although there are dissent-
ing voices (e.g. Atkinson et al. 1984), on balance micro studies …nd a (small)
in‡uence of unemployment insurance on re-employment probabilities. Aggregate
studies have failed to …nd a robust e¤ect, perhaps because of the complexity of
the system and the di¢culty of measuring accurately its dimensions in a time
series. For example, it has been claimed that the duration of unemployment ben-
e…ts is the most important dimension of the system that in‡uences matching. But
because there is very little time-series variation in the duration of entitlements,
only cross-country data can be used to test for this e¤ect. Yet, in cross-country
regressions variations in durations are also limited, with some countries having
unlimited durations and some restricting it to six or twelve months (see OECD,
1994, Pissarides, 1999). Another dimension of the unemployment insurance sys-
tem that has been emphasized in descriptive work is the leniency of the system.
In a time series it is di¢cult to get a good measure of leniency.
In conditioning on the state of the local labor market, only a few micro studies
(Nickell, 1979, Atkinson et al. 1984, Lindeboom et al. 1994 and Petrongolo,
2000) take into account the demand side of the labor market and employers’
search, by controlling for the local vacancy-to-unemployment ratio. A higher
labor market tightness, represented by the V=U ratio, signi…cantly increases the
13See Devine and Kiefer (1991) for a survey of hazard studies. Despite a rich literature on
the study of unemployment exit rates, little work has been done so far on vacancy durations.
Notable exceptions are van Ours and Ridder (1992, 1993) and, more recently, Burdett and
Cunningham (1998).
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job-…nding hazard in these studies, con…rming the results of aggregate studies.
Petrongolo (2000) also tests of the in‡uence of the size of the local market on
re-employment probabilities. Re-employment probabilities are conditioned on the
number of unemployed workers and vacancies within the travel-to-work area of
each worker. The coe¢cients on lnUt and lnVt are estimated separately and
found to be not signi…cantly di¤erent from each other across a number of di¤erent
speci…cations, which con…rms constant returns to scale in matching.14
5. Search on the Job and out of the Labor Force
A large number of job matches in modern labor markets are transitions from
other jobs or directly from out of the labor force to employment. The former
has an unambiguous theoretical interpretation: some employed workers are active
job seekers. The latter is more vague. Since anyone without a job and actively
searching for one is classi…ed as unemployed, the workers who move directly from
out of the labor force to employment are most likely the result of inadequate
measuring, due for example to the length of time between survey points. A
worker previously out of the labor force may become an active searcher and get a
job within a week, and so miss the classi…cation of unemployment in a monthly
survey. In countries where labor force surveys are quarterly this problem can lead
to large in‡ows of workers from out of the labor force to employment.
In principle there is no di¢culty introducing employed job seekers in the mod-
els underlying the matching function (in theoretical work on matching, those out
of the labor force who transit to employment directly do not have a separate sta-
tus from the unemployed, as the period of analysis can be made su¢ciently short
to ensure that all those who enter employment pass …rst from the pool of job seek-
ers). The way in which employed job seekers enter the matching function depends
on the assumptions that one makes about their search behavior and its relation to
that of the unemployed job seekers (Burgess, 1993, Pissarides, 1994). For exam-
ple, if employers prefer employed job seekers to the unemployed, a ranking model
could be used to arrive at (3.8), but with the number of employed job seekers
taking the place of the short-term unemployed in the expression and the total
number of unemployed workers ranking below them in the application queue.15
14Mention should also be made of the study by Lindeboom et al. (1994), who make use of
the link between the aggregate matching function and hazard rate speci…cations for evaluating
the relative e¤ectiveness of alternative search channels.
15This would be the most appropriate framework for the analysis of “vacancy chains”, whereby
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If, on the other hand, it is believed that the main di¤erence between employed and
unemployed job seekers is in the choice of search intensity or reservation wage, a
function like (3.6) or (3.7) would be more appropriate. We derive the matching
function (3.7) when there are employed job seekers as an illustration, under the
reasonable assumption that employed job seekers have di¤erent (usually higher)
reservation wage than unemployed job seekers.
Let RE be the mean reservation wage of employed job seekers and RU the
mean reservation wage of the unemployed. The number of unemployed seekers
is as before U and the number of employed job seekers E: The number of job
vacancies is V and all workers qualify for all vacancies. If the unemployed search
with intensity s and the employed with intensity normalized to unity, the contact
technology is m(sU + E; V ) and the probability that an employed worker meets
a job vacancy is m(sU + E;V )=(sU + E): The probability that this vacancy is
acceptable is 1¡G(RE); so the hazard rate for the employed is [1¡G(RE)]m(sU+
E; V )=(sU+E): The hazard rate for the unemployed satis…es a similar expression,
[1¡G(RU)]sm(sU+E; V )=(sU+E). Therefore, the aggregate matching function
is
M =
[1 ¡G(RE)]E + [1 ¡G(RU)]sU
E + sU
m(sU + E;V ): (5.1)
The introduction of employed job seekers opens up two empirical challenges,
which are also relevant to the group of workers who in the data move directly
from out of the labor force to employment. The …rst is the need to ensure a good
match between the ‡ow variable on the left-hand side of the equation and the
stock variable on the right-hand side. We have already encountered this problem
when we considered the implications of the group who ‡ow from unemployment
to out of the labor force and a similar measurement problem arises for those who
‡ow from employment and out of the labor force to employment. The second
challenge is partly one of theory. It is the question whether one can regress,
say, job matches from unemployment on the unemployment stock ignoring the
employed job seekers and those out of the labor force. Are the estimates of the
matching function elasticities obtained in this regression unbiased?
Before suggesting ways that the literature has dealt with these two questions
we summarize some evidence on the relative importance of employment in‡ows
that do not originate in recorded unemployment. Blanchard and Diamond (1989)
the employed take the new and better vacancies …rst, vacating jobs down the line, and the
unemployed get pushed to the bottom of the vacancy chain. See Contini and Revelli (1997) and
Akerlof et al. (1988).
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construct a job-to-job ‡ow series for the United States by making the assumption
that these ‡ows account for 40% of all job quits, the proportion estimated by
Akerlof et al. (1988), and that the quit rate for the economy as a whole is the
same as the quit rate in manufacturing. This procedure leads them to conclude
that job-to-job movements account on average for 15% of total hires in the period
1968-1981. The remainder 85% is accounted for by hires from unemployment
(45%) and hires from out of the labor force (40%).
Similar information for the United Kingdom can be derived from the Em-
ployment Audit which uses the quarterly Labour Force Survey data. Job-to-job
moves in 1992 represented 51% of total hires, while ‡ows from unemployment and
inactivity represented 21% and 27% respectively. Due to the three-month gap
between observations, these data tend to overstate the importance of job-to-job
moves and moves from out of the labor force (and understate those from unem-
ployment, as many workers with less than three month unemployment durations
are missed in the unemployment count). Even allowing for some correction, how-
ever, Pissarides (1994) suggests a lower bound for job-to-job moves of 40% of
total hires. Elsewhere in Europe, job switches appear to be less frequent than in
the United Kingdom. Burda and Wyplosz (1994) estimate that in Germany in
1987 job-to-job ‡ows represented 16% of employment in‡ows, with the rest being
shared in equal proportions by unemployment and inactivity ‡ows. The picture
for German worker ‡ows is thus similar to the US picture. In France, 67% of the
employment in‡ow was accounted for by unemployment out‡ows, with job-to-job
‡ows accounting for a mere 10% and ‡ows out of inactivity for 23%.
Thus both ‡ows out of inactivity and job-to-job switches are large relative
to the unemployment out‡ow. There is virtually no evidence on the properties
of the ‡ow from inactivity into jobs but some evidence on the properties of the
job-to-job ‡ow may shed light on its in‡uence on the unemployment ‡ow. What
little evidence there is on the cyclical properties of ‡ows in and out of inactivity
gives mixed signals. Blanchard and Diamond (1989, 1990a) note that the ‡ow
of hires from out of the labor force is procyclical in the United States, while
Burda and Wyplosz (1994) conclude that ‡ows in and out of the labor force do
not exhibit any particular cyclical pattern in Europe. A rich body of evidence,
however, con…rms that job-to-job ‡ows are procyclical and closely linked to the
quit rate.
Burgess (1993) builds a model of competition between employed and unem-
ployed job seekers, and explains the procyclicality of job switches by modeling
employed job search on the basis of a reservation wage rule. Employed workers
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whose wages fall below the (endogenous) reservation wage start searching for a
better job. The reservation wage increases when the probability of receiving a job
o¤er is higher, so, when the frequency of job o¤ers rises in a boom, the employed
have a stronger incentive to search, partially crowding out the unemployed from
new jobs. In addition to this congestion e¤ect, Pissarides (1994) argues that dur-
ing a boom employers open vacancies that are more attractive to the employed,
given that their proportion in the pool of job applicants rises, and destroy jobs
that employed workers quit, which are now acceptable only to the unemployed.
This further enhances the procyclicality of job-to-job ‡ows. More recently, Boeri
(1995) combines endogenous employed job search with the possibility that unem-
ployed job search has di¤erent intensities at di¤erent durations.
Recent empirical work explicitly takes into account employed job search and
sometimes out-of-labor-force job search. Blanchard and Diamond (1989) use al-
ternative de…nitions of the relevant pool of searchers, allowing the unemployed
and those classi…ed as inactive to be perfect substitutes up to a scalar level. They
…nd that inactive workers do not enter the matching function with a signi…cant
coe¢cient. Following a similar procedure, Boeri (1995) …nds that the unemploy-
ment out‡ow in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom is not a¤ected by all
employed job search but only by search of those on temporary jobs or jobs that
are at risk.
For the United Kingdom, Burgess (1993) and Att…eld and Burgess (1995) …nd
evidence of endogenous job competition between employed and unemployed job
seekers, obtaining an elasticity of the unemployment out‡ow with respect to total
hires below 1. The standard matching function in U and V is then re-interpreted
as a reduced-form relation for the unemployment out‡ow arising from the simul-
taneous determination of matching and job competition between employed and
unemployed job-seekers, with on-the-job search being expressed as a function of
the unemployment level. Similarly, Mumford and Smith (1997) use Australian
data to extend the job search competition to workers who are out of labor force,
and …nd evidence of inactive workers ranking below the unemployed, who in turn
rank below the employed in the process of …lling vacancies. No evidence of job
competition is detected instead by van Ours (1995) for the Netherlands, …nding
that employed and unemployed workers mainly apply for di¤erent kinds of jobs.
It would appear from the literature discussed so far that data limitations make
it di¢cult to ensure that the ‡ow and stock variables in empirical matching func-
tions refer to the same group of workers. The literature so far has not suggested
a good alternative to collecting the relevant data. It has not explored the im-
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plications of omitting the job-to-job ‡ow in a regression of the unemployment
matching rate, given the well-documented procyclicality of that ‡ow. Of course,
if employed job seekers did not cause congestion for the unemployed because they
applied to di¤erent kinds of jobs, as van Ours’s (1995) work seems to imply, that
would cause no problems in the estimation of the matching function for the un-
employed. But suppose instead, for the sake of illustration, that the employed
and unemployed apply to the same kinds of jobs and so congestion externalities
are present. The simplest matching function in this case is m(E + U; V ); with
the notation as before. The number of matches that go to unemployed workers





m(E + U; V ): (5.2)
Let m(E+U) in (5.2) satisfy the Cobb-Douglas restrictions with constant returns
to scale and the elasticity with respect to job seekers equal to ´; a number between
0 and 1: Then (5.2) becomes, after rearranging,
lnMU = (1 ¡ ´) lnV ¡ (1 ¡ ´) ln(E + U) + lnU; (5.3)
where constants and other terms unrelated to U and V have been omitted.
This equation is, of course, simple to estimate, provided we have data for the
stock of employed job seekers. Interestingly, we need such data even if our interest
is only in the unemployment ‡ow, because of the congestion that the employed
cause for the unemployed. An increase in the number of employed job seekers
reduces the transition rate of the unemployed into new jobs. Yet, although equa-
tion (5.3) is of the type estimated by several authors, the number of employed
job seekers, E; is not normally included among the regressors. The closest ap-
proximation to (5.3) can be found in Burgess (1993) for the United Kingdom and
Mumford and Smith (1997) for Australia. The speci…cation estimated by Burgess
regresses ln (MU=U) on ln (M=L) and ln (U=L) (where M denotes total matches)
and represents the reduced form equation stemming from a model of job compe-
tition between employed and unemployed job seekers, in which on-the-job search
is a function of M=L and U=L: Mumford and Smith regress ln (MU=U) on lnM ,
lnU and ln (E=U), in which E is proxied by the number of job quitters in the
previous period.
To see the implications of the omission of E from the list of regressors, suppose
that the cycle is measured by the ratio V=U; the tightness of the labor market, and
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let E = ¸(V=U)®: Given the responsiveness of the number of employed job seekers
to the cycle, the coe¢cient ® is positive and likely to exceed 1: Then if a log-linear
form of (5.3) is estimated with lnV and lnU as independent variables, omitting
E; the coe¢cients estimated are approximately the elasticities of matches, MU ;
with respect to V and U evaluated at sample means. Let these be ¯V and ¯U :
Di¤erentiation of (5.3) with E = ¸(V=U)® gives,
¯V = (1 ¡ ´)
µ




¯U = ´ + (1 ¡ ´)(1 + ®) EE + U ; (5.5)
with E=(E + U) evaluated at its sample mean.
Two implications follow from these expressions. First, the regression that
omits E will give too low an estimate of the e¤ect of vacancies on matchings
and too high an estimate of the e¤ect of unemployment, when compared with the
underlying elasticity ´. As a corollary, if the objective is to estimate the coe¢cient
´; the estimate obtained from the estimated ¯s is biased upward. This is a direct
implication of the pro-cyclicality of employed job search, since if ® = 0; ¯V gives
an unbiased estimate of ´: Second, if the matching function satis…es constant
returns, as assumed, then a test of constant returns by comparing the coe¢cients
¯V and ¯U ; as normally done in the literature, will reject constant returns in favor
of increasing returns, since,
¯V + ¯U = 1 + (1 ¡ ´) EE + U : (5.6)
Conversely, if constant returns is accepted on the ¯s, the underlying matching
function with employed job seekers included satis…es decreasing returns to scale.16
6. Aggregation Issues
6.1. Time aggregation
The matching function describes a process that takes place continually in spatially
distinct locations. The use of discrete-time data for arbitrary regional divisions
16Of course, it is also possible that the sum of the coe¢cients of both regressions fall within
the con…dence interval implied by constant returns, although their point estimates may di¤er
in the direction pointed out.
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to estimate aggregate matching functions introduces both temporal and spatial
aggregation problems.
Time aggregation problems arise when ‡ow variables are estimated as func-
tions of stock conditioning variables. This happens in the empirical production
literature, where a production function is used to describe the ‡ow of output
from the stocks of inputs. Similarly, the matching function describes the ‡ow of
matches as a function of the stocks of unemployment and vacancies. In order to
analyze the problems introduced by time aggregation in this case, we consider for
convenience an explicit log-linear version of the matching function and introduce
a well-behaved disturbance term ²t
lnMt = ®0 + ®1 lnVt + ®2 lnUt + ²t: (6.1)
If Mt is measured as a ‡ow over a time period, and Ut and Vt as stocks at
some point during the period, Ut and Vt are depleted by matches Mt, and this
generates a downward bias in the estimated coe¢cients ®1 and ®2. This problem is
often dealt with by using beginning-of-period stocks Ut¡1 and Vt¡1 as conditioning
variables or as instruments for Ut and Vt. If there is no serial correlation in the
error term, lagged stocks Ut¡1 and Vt¡1 are uncorrelated with ²t and are therefore
good instruments.
But whatever stock variable is used on the right-hand side of the equation, the
dependent variable is mismeasured, being the aggregated ‡ow over a time interval
during which the stocks change. The measured out‡ow over some time interval
does not only include the out‡ow from the initial stocks, but also the out‡ow from
the in‡ow over the same interval. For periods even as short as a quarter this can
give rise to a situation in which the total out‡ow during the interval exceeds the
initial stock. For vacancies, whose average completed duration is in most cases
under a month, even monthly data would deliver exit rates above 1.
Here we discuss this problem more formally using an exponential probability
distribution of duration, characterized by constant hazard with respect to du-
ration during the measurement period. Assuming a hazard rate ¸; the survival
probability of an unemployed worker is S(t) = exp(¡¸t), with t denoting the
elapsed duration of search. The probability of being matched (the out‡ow rate)
over a time period of length t is therefore F (t) = 1 ¡ exp(¡¸t).
Let us consider a period of unit length. Assuming an initial stock of unem-





1 ¡ e¡¸´U0 + Z 1
0
h
1 ¡ e¡¸(1¡t)iu(t)dt (6.2)
where the …rst term denotes the out‡ow from the initial stock and the second
denotes the out‡ow from the in‡ow. A symmetric expression can be computed
for vacancies. Estimating (6.1) on discrete data using beginning-of-period stocks
as conditioning variables therefore omits the originating stocks for the number of
matches represented by the second term in (6.2).




1 ¡ e¡¸´U0 + ·1 ¡ 1¸ ³1 ¡ e¡¸´
¸
u: (6.3)
It can be noted that the term in square brackets is bounded between zero and
one, and therefore describes a plausible out‡ow rate from the in‡ow. Also the
out‡ow rate from the in‡ow is lower than the one from the stock, for the reason
that the in‡ow has, on average, less time available for a successful match.
In order to take into account the matches generated by in‡ows u and v, right-
hand side variables in (6.1) should include the beginning-of-period stock, plus
some proportion of the in‡ow. Given that each agent in U0 has a matching
probability which is
³
1 ¡ e¡¸´¡1¡ 1¸ times the matching probability of each agent
in u, the pool of unemployed job seekers between time 0 and time 1 can be
expressed in homogeneous “search units” as
U0 +
·³




and similarly for vacancies. In order to compute the expression in (6.4), the
hazard rate ¸ can be obtained by estimating equation (6.3) on stocks and ‡ows.
Alternatively, for small enough ¸; the term in square brackets in (6.4) can be
approximated by 1=2, using a second order Taylor expansion of exp(¡¸) around
¸ = 0:
Gregg and Petrongolo (1997) follow the latter procedure in order to deal with
the time aggregation problem in the estimation of an aggregate matching function
for Britain for the period 1967-1995. Their analysis combines this treatment of
time aggregation with a stock-‡ow matching mechanism (see Section 3.5). The
resulting matching function estimates suggest that there has been no deterioration
in the matching e¤ectiveness of vacancies over the period considered. There seems
instead to have been some fall in the matching e¤ectiveness of the unemployed,
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although less severe than that implied by the conventional stock-based analysis of
matching (namely, the in‡uence of the time trend of aggregate studies is reduced).
Berman (1997) uses instead the sum of beginning-of-period stocks and sub-
sequent ‡ows to construct a proper instrument for Ut and Vt in estimating a
log-linear referral function for Israel over the period 1978-1990. IV estimation de-
livers higher elasticities of referrals with respect to unemployment and vacancies
than OLS estimation, detecting a downward (simultaneity) bias in OLS estimates.
An alternative way of ensuring matching probabilities strictly bounded be-
tween 0 and 1; proposed by den Haan et al. (1997), departs from the standard
log-linear speci…cation (6.1). They consider that matching takes place when a
…rm and a worker meet through a pair-speci…c channel. There are Jt channels
in the economy, and each agent is randomly assigned to one of them. With this
procedure, a worker locates a vacancy with probability Vt=Jt, and a …rm locates a
worker with probability Ut=Jt: Matches are given by Mt = UtVt=Jt. The proper-
ties of this matching function depend on the speci…cation of Jt. The speci…cation
adopted by the authors is Jt =
³
U lt + V lt
´1=l
, which restricts exit rates of unem-
ployment and vacancies between 0 and 1, as l goes from 0 to 1: den Haan et
al. use these functions in a dynamic general equilibrium model with productivity
shocks. The calibration of their model delivers a close match with data on labor
market ‡ows when the parameter l is set equal to 1:27:
Going back to empirics, Burdett et al. (1994) show that the use of beginning-
of-period stocks as sole conditioning variables generates a bias in the resulting
elasticities of Mt with respect to Ut¡1 and Vt¡1 that depends on the time series
properties of the two stocks. Suppose that both Ut¡1 and Vt¡1 are mean-reverting
series, an assumption which is implicit in a matching function where the number
of matches is a positive function of Ut¡1 and Vt¡1. In this case the average size of
a stock over a time period tends to be negatively correlated with the size at the
beginning of the period. This implies that, when unemployment (or the number
of vacancies) is above the mean, the average size of the stock during the following
period will be smaller, depleting the number of aggregate matches during the
period. On the other hand, when the initial stock is below the mean, its size
tends to increase afterwards, generating a higher number of intra-period matches.
This mechanism generates a downward bias in the estimated elasticities of Mt
with respect to Ut¡1 and Vt¡1:
It is shown however that, for a small enough measuring interval, the size of
the bias is approximately a linear function of its length. Thus the size of the bias
can be estimated by doubling the length of the measuring interval and comparing
37
the obtained coe¢cients with those estimated using the original data frequency.
This procedure, applied by Burdett et al. to the data used by Blanchard and
Diamond, suggests that the bias is not important whenever the data frequency is
monthly or higher and the cycle frequency is yearly or higher.
6.2. Spatial aggregation
The other issue that links aggregate production and matching technologies is
aggregation across space. As in the empirical production literature, most authors
of empirical matching functions aggregate the number of unemployed workers and
job vacancies across space and use the aggregates to explain the ‡ow of job matches
in the same space. This practice treats the aggregate economy as a single labor
market, ignoring the fact that it might be a collection of spatially distinct labor
markets with possibly little interaction. The relevant issue is whether aggregating
local labor market data biases the resulting estimates.
Coles and Smith (1996) argue that spatial aggregation might bias the results
towards constant returns to scale in the matching function, while the matching
process could display increasing returns instead. The underlying intuition is that
replicating a marketplace of a given size and with a given number of searchers
should double the number of matches if there is no interaction between the two
marketplaces. But if there is interaction, the number of matches more than dou-
bles, because cross-border matches can now be formed. So with interactions be-
tween markets, matches more than double when the number of searchers doubles
within the original marketplace, implying increasing returns to scale. Since inter-
actions are likely to be more common in more dense markets, Coles and Smith
conclude that in estimation density is likely to be more important than market
size, something for which they …nd evidence in their study. Indeed they …nd con-
stant returns to scale on average but with more dense markets delivering higher
matching rates for given size of the vacancy and unemployment pools.
Constant returns to scale are also not rejected in a similar study by Bennet
and Pinto (1994), who estimate separate local matching functions over the period
1985-1991 for 104 areas of Training and Enterprise Councils that cover Britain.
They …nd that most of the estimates for the returns to scale range between 0.7
and 1.15.
A further issue concerns the interaction between local matching and regional
migration or commuting behavior. The importance of job search considerations in
worker migration is recognized by Jackman and Savouri (1992). They note that
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the direction of gross migration ‡ows in Britain is consistent with a job search
approach, in which migration is interpreted as the outcome of job matching. The
magnitude of migration ‡ows is best explained in time series regressions by the
evolution of the total number of job-worker matches. Regional migration facts are
instead di¢cult to reconcile with the predictions of competitive human capital
theory, mainly on the grounds that high wage regions do not seem to attract
signi…cant migration ‡ows.
The e¤ects of regional migration and commuting on local matching conditions
are analyzed by Burda and Pro…t (1996). They represent an aggregate econ-
omy as a two-dimensional space divided into a number of districts. Workers’
decisions determine search intensity in all districts, namely how many jobs to
apply for in each district. This extension of the matching function to the spatial
dimension relates job matching in a district to economic conditions everywhere
in the economy, inducing a network of complex spillover e¤ects between neigh-
boring districts. Burda and Pro…t estimate a matching function that embodies
regional spillovers for 76 Czech labor market districts, and …nd signi…cant e¤ects
of neighboring unemployment on local matching. Constant returns to scale in the
matching function cannot be rejected. This speci…cation is also used by Burgess
and Pro…t (1998) in order to study local matching and spillovers in 303 British
travel-to-work areas. They …nd that more unemployed job-seekers (vacancies) in
neighboring areas raise the local vacancy (unemployment) out‡ow but lower the
local unemployment (vacancy) out‡ow.
Along similar lines, Petrongolo and Wasmer (1999) estimate a matching func-
tion for Britain (1986-1995) and France (1983-1994), using a regional panel for
each country. Cross-regional spillovers are considered, allowing each worker to
search in her own and other regions with di¤erent search intensities. It is found
that search intensity is positive and signi…cant in regions that are adjacent to the
one where the worker lives, although it is only about 10% of the level of search
intensity in the region of residence. Constant returns to scale in the matching
function are not rejected by either the British or the French data, in contrast to
the aggregate study for France in Table 3, which found decreasing returns.
In conclusion, although the problem of spatial aggregation has only recently
been discussed in the estimation of matching functions, the …ndings of those who
explicitly embody a spatial dimension into the estimation do not invalidate earlier
results on aggregate matching functions. Their analysis, however, sheds more light
on the regional dimensions of job matching and the spillovers between regions.
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7. Conclusions
Like most other aggregate functions in the macroeconomist’s tool kit, the match-
ing function is a black box: we have good intuition about its existence and proper-
ties but only some tentative ideas about its microfoundations. Yet, those tentative
ideas have not been rigorously tested. They have been used only to provide justi-
…cation for the inclusion or exclusion of variables from the estimation of aggregate
or regional matching functions, leaving it to the empirical speci…cation to come
up with a convincing functional form.
The early aggregate studies converged on a Cobb-Douglas matching function
with the ‡ow of hires on the left-hand side and the stock of unemployment and
job vacancies on the right-hand side, satisfying constant returns to scale, and with
the coe¢cient on unemployment in the range 0.5-0.7. In some of the estimates
that use total hires as dependent variable (not only hires from unemployment) the
coe¢cient on unemployment is lower, in the range 0.3-0.4, and the coe¢cient on
vacancies correspondingly higher. But estimation of both Beveridge curves and
aggregate matching functions points also to other variables that in‡uence the sim-
ple Cobb-Douglas relationship. Much of the estimation of matching functions in
the last decade has looked for those other variables and for better empirical spec-
i…cations. Micro studies suggest as additional variables the age structure of the
labor force, the geographical dispersion of job vacancies and unemployed workers,
the incidence of long-term unemployment (exceeding one year), and unemploy-
ment insurance; interestingly, however, although the other variables have been
found signi…cant where tested, unemployment insurance has not been identi…ed
as a signi…cant in‡uence on aggregate matching rates. We have argued that this
may be related to measurement problems and the di¢culty of getting a reliable
time series for the generosity of unemployment insurance systems.
Recent empirical work has used disaggregate data and modeled the micro
matching functions more carefully, paying attention to the issue of consistency
between the timing of the ‡ows and the timing of the stocks in the regressions,
the regional spillovers in matching, and the consistency between the ‡ow and
stock variables, given the observation that many matches involve either employed
workers or workers classi…ed as out of the labor force. The precision of the es-
timation has increased and the relation between hazard function estimation and
aggregate matching function estimation has become clearer. It has been found
that aggregation problems have played a role in some of the shifts in the aggre-
gate matching function, though not to an extent that can render the aggregate
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function “unstable”. Despite all the re…nements and detailed tests, the …ndings of
the …rst aggregate studies have not been challenged: the stable, constant returns
aggregate function used in macroeconomic modeling …nds strong support in the
data of virtually all modern economies where tests have been conducted.
Future work needs to elaborate a number of issues. The search for microfoun-
dations needs to continue, and rigorous tests of plausible alternatives done. Good
microfoundations can aid the estimation of structural coe¢cients, which are used
in model calibrations and policy analysis. Currently, the most popular functional
form, Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale, is driven by its empirical suc-
cess and lacks microfoundations. The most popular microeconomic models, such
as the urn-ball game, do not perform as well empirically. Yet, di¤erent microeco-
nomic matching mechanisms have di¤erent implications for wage determination
and other types of behavior in markets with frictions and can help in the design
of optimal policy toward unemployment and inequality.
On the empirical side, on-the-job search and search out of the labor force
need to be more carefully measured and their implications for unemployed search
and matching studied. The meaning of constant returns also needs to be studied
further. Although constant returns in the numbers involved in matching are
supported, there have been no rigorous tests of the plausible property that the
quality of matches is better in larger markets, on the grounds that participants
have more choices. This may be more true in skilled labor markets, where skill
heterogeneities are more likely to matter, opening up the possibility of di¤erent
matching technologies for di¤erent types of skill.
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8. Appendix: Some History
What is the history of the matching function and how did labor economists deal
with frictions before the recent vintage of models?
Early writers on the economics of labor markets were aware of the importance
of frictions but were unable to bring them into their formal models. Hicks (1932)
in the Theory of Wages devoted a chapter to unemployment. After introducing
the “commonplace” de…nitions of unemployment, he made the claim that some
kinds of unemployment induce wage changes and some do not; the ones that
do not are “consistent with constant supply and demand for labor” and they
make up “normal unemployment”. An important reason for the existence of
normal unemployment, which is close to Phelps’s (1967) and Friedman’s (1968)
equilibrium or “natural” unemployment, is the fact that
although the industry as a whole is stationary, some …rms in it will
be closing down or contracting their sphere of operations, others will
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be arising or expanding to take their place. Some …rms, then, will
be dismissing, others taking on labor; and when they are not situ-
ated close together, so that knowledge of opportunities is imperfect,
and transference is attended by all the di¢culties of …nding housing
accommodation, and the uprooting and transplanting of social ties,
it is not surprising that an interval of time elapses between dismissal
and re-engagement, during which the workman is unemployed. (Hicks,
1963, p.45).
Moreover, he claimed that these costs, the frictions, are important in deter-
mining equilibrium wages, because they imply a range of indeterminacy due to
monopoly rents. But more importantly, frictions according to Hicks (1963, chap-
ter 4), slow down the response of (real) wages to shocks and so are a major cause
of short-run disequilibrium in the labor market.
Hutt (1939) also emphasized the importance of frictions in modern labor mar-
kets. In his Theory of Idle Resources he attempted to distinguish various supply-
side reasons for unemployment, in the hope that they would be brought into the
demand-side models of Keynes and others. Amongst them he included workers
who are “actively searching for work” because they “judge that the search for a
better opening is worth the risk of immediately foregone income”. He then ar-
gued that such individuals should not be counted as unemployed because they
are working on their own account and doing the job that an employment agency
would do “if the course of politics had allowed such an institution to emerge in
modern society” (Hutt, 1939, p. 60). Ironically, these individuals are the only
ones counted as unemployed according to modern de…nitions.
Hutt’s plea to his contemporaries to take into account such causes of unem-
ployment was ignored. The dominant view of unemployment that emerged out of
the depression of the 1930s was Keynes’s view that the unemployment that Hicks
called “normal” could be ignored. Keynes (1936, p.6) de…ned some kinds of unem-
ployment as compatible with “full employment” and uninteresting from his point
of view, along similar lines to Hicks (1932) (though without crediting him). He
called these kinds “frictional” - probably the …rst use of the term - and “between
jobs”, due to “various inexactness of adjustment which stand in the way of full
employment”. He also included “voluntary” unemployment to the kinds compat-
ible with full employment. He credited Pigou (undated) for the best exposition
of the “classical” view but criticized him for concentrating on real factors only
and for claiming that only “frictional” unemployment will exist in equilibrium,
and therefore “such unemployment as exists at any time is due wholly to the fact
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that changes in demand conditions are continually taking place and that frictional
resistances prevent the appropriate wage adjustments from being made instanta-
neously” (Pigou’s words, quoted by Keynes, 1936, p. 278). Thus, like Hicks,
Pigou blamed frictions mainly for slow (real) wage adjustments, a point which
Keynes considered irrelevant, if not erroneous (Keynes, 1936, p.278), to the point
that he called the title of Pigou’s book, Theory of Unemployment, “something of
a misnomer” (p.275).
Keynes’s followers replaced the slow real adjustment emphasized by Hicks
and Pigou by slow nominal adjustment but did not attribute it to real frictions.
Frictions re-appeared in the literature some time later, and only after Phelps
(1967) and Friedman (1968) reiterated Hicks’s claims that in equilibrium there
is some “normal” unemployment, which is independent of nominal factors and
which does not induce wage adjustments (see Phelps, 1968, Mortensen, 1970,
Holt, 1970a,b, and other contributions to Phelps et al. 1970). The frictions in
Phelps’s and Mortensen’s models were summarized in a ‡ow-of-labor function
which depended on the …rm’s relative wage o¤er. (Of course, in competitive
theory the elasticity of the ‡ow-of-labor function to the individual …rm is in…nite.)
The mechanism assumed by Phelps and Mortensen was similar to one of the
mechanisms in modern “e¢ciency wage” theory, and the more recent work of
Phelps (1994) recasts that assumption more formally in an equilibrium framework
with unemployment (see also Salop, 1979). Holt’s papers are more in the tradition
of older “structural” analyses (see, e.g. Dow and Dicks-Mireaux, 1958) and like the
earlier analyses he assumes a relation between unemployment and job vacancies
which implies scale economies in frictional equilibrium.
Early criticisms of the Phelps-Mortensen approach by Rothschild (1973) and
others, who demonstrated that the optimizing actions of agents in these mod-
els could not support the assumed wage distribution, and also Diamond’s (1971)
demonstration that in sequential search price will converge to the monopoly price,
led to attempts to …nd reasons for the persistence of wage di¤erentials in equilib-
rium.17 Successful user-friendly models with wage distributions for homogeneous
labor, however, did not appear in the literature until Burdett and Mortensen’s
17The equilibrium model of Lucas and Prescott (1974), although innovative, was di¢cult to
merge with mainstream analysis. The debt that it owes to the ideas in the Phelps volume is
obvious, with its island equilibrium and the slow mobility across the islands, but its assumption
that each island is in competitive equilibirum is very di¤erent from the “non-Walrasian” ideas
in the Phelps volume. Both the model and the subsequent empirical implementation by Lilien
(1982) inspired a lot of work but eventually the framework used to test Lilien’s “sectoral shifts”
hypothesis became more akin to search and matching models.
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(1998) demonstration that search models with wage posting could support wage
distributions when workers search on the job.18 Jovanovic’s (1979) model of job-
speci…c productivity di¤erences for ex ante homogenous labor could also be used
to derive wage distributions in equilibrium search models. But the main impetus
for new theoretical work in search theory came from the realization that there are
large ‡ows of jobs and workers in modern labor markets and that search models
could shed light on them.19
The “matching function” was the key concept in the new generation of mod-
els. Although something resembling it was present in several earlier models,20
models that used it to simplify the characterization of equilibrium, by doing away
with the wage distribution and the explicit modeling of the search decision, …rst
appeared in the literature in the late 1970s. Butters (1977) described a process
of the urn-ball type by which sellers let buyers know of their prices by posting
advertisements at random in their mailboxes. Hall (1979) used this example to
describe how recruiting …rms select workers out of a homogenous unemployment
pool, and derived an explicit functional form for the “job-…nding rate.” Pissarides
(1979) derived the same functional form and combined it with a general constant-
returns-to-scale “job matchings function,” to describe the search and matching
outcomes. Diamond and Maskin (1979) assumed that meetings in a frictional
market are governed by a “search technology,” which can be approximated by
linear or quadratic functions. Bowden (1980) examined vacancy-unemployment
dynamics in search markets by making use of an “engagements” function that is
linear-homogenous in the participating vacancies and unemployed workers. Inter-
estingly, he gave as example the Cobb-Douglas form, with the constant measuring
the e¢ciency of matching. The equilibrium models that in‡uenced subsequent de-
velopments appeared soon after these authors demonstrated the usefulness of the
concept of the matching function in capturing the e¤ects of frictions on market
18Precursors to this model appeared earlier in response to Diamond’s (1971) monopoly price
demonstration. See Burdett and Judd (1983). More generally, the condition for the existence of
a wage distribution is that workers should have access to more than one wage o¤er at the same
time. See Lang (1991) and Montgomery (1991) who discuss wage inequality in the context of
search models.
19For early studies of empirical ‡ows see Hall (1972), Feldstein (1973), Marston (1976) and
Clark and Summers (1979). Later, the work of Leonard (1987), Dunne et al. (1989), Davis
et al (1996), Blanchard and Diamond (1990a) and others provided new stimulus to theoretical
developments.
20Notable early models with something akin to a matching fucntion include the Phelps (1968),
Mortensen (1970) and Holt (1970b) papers in the Phelps volume, Hansen (1970) and earlier
mechanical models of the Phillips and Beveridge curves, such as Dow and Dicks-Mireaux (1958).
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outcomes.21
21For surveys of related literature see Mortensen and Pissarides (1999a,b) on the recent lit-
erature on search equilibrium, Mortensen (1986) on models up to 1984 and Devine and Kiefer
(1991) on early empirical research in the context of search theory.
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